



# **Market Coupling**

Ronnie Belmans 21 June 2007 Warsaw, Poland



### **Overview**


- Introduction
- The situation in Europe and the US
- Belpex and Trilateral Market Coupling (TLC)
- A look into the future

# Introduction of markets in Europe

- Top down process constrained by
  - « subsidiarity principle »
- General conditions for market creation
  - Market opening, third party access, unbundling
- Initially too much freedom and long term deadlines
  - 1st Directive 96/92/EC allowed nearly everything except an Internal Electricity Market (Hancher)
- Recently less freedom and shorter term deadlines
  - 2nd Directive 2003/54/EC




## **Evolution forward volumes**



#### Source: DG COMP

## **Evolution spot volumes**



#### Source: DG COMP

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


Why Power Exchanges ?

- Short time interaction between demand and supply
- Anonymous
- Price signal for the market of bilateral contracts
- Close to delivery, generators and traders are vulnerable
- Physical aspects remain important

#### Why power exchanges? Price signal for the market of bilateral contracts





Source: DG COMP Sector Inquiry

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### Why power exchanges? Physical aspects

- Generation
  - Power output
  - Cost of primary energy
  - Start-up time
  - Dynamics
  - Lack of predictability
  - Physical storage (pumped hydro)
  - Maintenance
- Transmission capacity
- Balancing load and generation







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- Electricity Directive 2003/54/EC
- Moving away from (concentrated) national markets towards a European market for electricity

Interconnecting different zones
Market Coupling: all participants acting in the same market


# Introduction of markets in Europe Status

- Markets mainly national
  - Divers rules and procedures
- Wholesale trade
  - Mainly bilateral
    - Negotiated tailor made long term contracts
    - **o Over The Counter (OTC) trade** 
      - Sometimes organized by power exchanges
  - Supplemented with
    - **o** Anonymous day-ahead auction trade
      - Organized by power exchanges



- Mainly national auctions
- Steps towards one market:
  - NordPool
  - TLC

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




#### DG COMPETITION REPORT ON ENERGY SECTOR INQUIRY 10 January 2007


- Competition initially lowered energy prices in Europe in line with market fundamentals
- However
  - while progress has been made
  - the objectives of market opening have not yet been achieved
- Key areas which need to be addressed
  - (2) vertical foreclosure (most prominently inadequate unbundling of network and supply)
  - (3) <u>lack of market integration</u> (including lack of regulatory oversight for cross border issues)
  - (4) lack of transparency
  - (5) price formation
  - (6) downstream markets
  - (7) balancing markets
  - (8) liquefied natural gas (LNG)

# The Internal Electricity Market (IEM) Limited interconnections



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# The Internal Electricity Market (IEM) Limited interconnections



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
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# The reference design PJM day-ahead Power Pool

- Mandatory participation
  - Demand side: consumers or their representatives (retailers/suppliers)
  - Supply side: generators
- Internal network constraints are taken into account
  - → Nodal pricing





# European Power Exchanges Day-ahead auctions

AP% Group

**P**<sup>2</sup>wernext

HE NORDIC POWER EXC

EXAA

GME

#### Less efficient but simpler design

- Network constraints ignored
- Generators cannot explicitly express costs and constraints
  - o start-up costs, ramping limits etc
- Pricing is linear
  - o No side-payments




# Design inefficiencies Europe <u>some nuances</u>

- PX have started to introduce new products
  - Allowing generators to implicitly express their costs and constraints (e.g. block orders..)
- Efficiency loss due to imposing linear prices is relatively small (Meeus et al, 2006)
- Full nodal leads to illiquid markets
  - Also power pools use a single price for several physical nodes
  - Some EU countries can already split up in several price zones

# Market integration North America (e.g. US)


- Markets
  - Patchwork developing and mature markets <> no market
  - Process slowed down
    - o 2001 California failure
    - o 2003 Black-out
- Market integration
  - Markets weakly linked (if at all)
  - <u>Agglomerative magnets</u> (Jens Weinmann, FSR 2007)






# **US electricity markets**





# Scale of Market Integration in Europe Energy Community



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# Market integration Europe Situation 2005


- <u>Availability cross-border</u> <u>capacity</u>
  - Interconnector scarcity
  - Historical contracts
- Access to available cross-border capacity
  - First come, first served
    - Historical ranking
    - Ranking based on usage
  - Pro-Rata Allocation
    - Participants ask up to what is available
    - Pro-rata allocation if more requested than available
  - Other (Merchant)

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# Market integration Europe Situation end 2006

- <u>Availability cross-border</u> <u>capacity</u>
  - Interconnector scarcity, but some investment, e.g. F-B
  - Historical contracts under pressure, e.g. F-NL cancelled (Case C-17/03 SEP NL)
- Access to available cross-border capacity
  - Regulation 1228
    - o Marked based
  - Guidelines
    - Market based = <u>explicit</u> or <u>implicit</u> auction




# Creation of agglomerative magnet?



#### **Coupling day-ahead auctions**

- Border capacities used to optimize the clearing of orders
- Removes risk of trading energy and border capacities separately
- Better use of capacities, reduced price volatility





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## Market coupling/splitting Day-ahead auctions

**Explicit auction** 

**Implicit auction** 

**Pro-Rata Allocation** 


**Merchant** 

Other



2003: PX in Belgium: liquidity?

21 Nov 2006: start-up Belpex, coupled with Powernext and APX from start






**Belpex and TLC** 

### A power exchange for the Belgian market

- Risk of illiquidity
- An efficient system was preferred


e.g.: Electricity market in Western Denmark



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## Use of interconnection capacity


Utilization of daily allocated capacity on FR-BE border before and after introduction of market coupling Source: Belpex



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## **Use of interconnection capacity**

Utilization of daily allocated capacity on BE-NL border before and after introduction of market coupling Source: Belpex



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
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## **Use of interconnection capacity**

**Relative usage North border** 


Source: Belpex



# Use of interconnection capacity Export/Import pattern: hours

Source: Belpex

#### Average Import/Export position (Hours)




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#### Use of interconnection capacity Export/Import pattern: energy

Source: Belpex

#### Average Import/Export position (Energy)



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## Use of interconnection capacity Export/Import pattern

Source: Belpex

#### Export/Import average position 24:00 22:00 -20:00 600-700 500-600 -18:00 400-500 **300-400** -16:00 200-300 **1**00-200 -14:00 0-100 **-100-0** -12:00Time **-200--100** -300--200 -10:00 -400--300 -500--400 -8:00 -600--500 -700--600 -6:00 -800--700 4:00 -2:00 -0:00 45 2 1 2 3 5 2 3 6 1 3 4 5 6 4 6 7 Week day NL F Β


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#### Interconnection flow vs ΔPrice Before

Source: Belpex

Use of F - NL "Capacity" (% of av capacity)<sub>versus</sub> Price difference (€) Before MC




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## Interconnection flow vs ΔPrice After

Source: Belpex

Use of F - B capacity (% of av capacity)<sub>versus</sub> Price difference (€) during MC



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### Interconnection flow vs ΔPrice After

Source: Belpex

Use of B - NL capacity (% of av capacity) versus Price difference (€) during MC

40.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 -100.0% -80.0% -60.0% -40.0% -20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 40.0% 60.0% 80.0% 100.0% -10.0 -20.0

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


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- Use of border capacity
  - Also intra-day and realtime
    - Development of a new platform
    - o Coupling needed?
  - Also secondary markets (UIOLI → UIOSI)





Provide for alternative trading opportunities prior to and after the Belpex Day-Ahead Market

➔Intraday Market?

What?

- Continuous trading of electricity up to one hour prior to delivery
- Hourly and/or quarterly hour products
- Cleared and anonymous
- •Why?
  - Manage portfolio imbalances (changing environment between D-1 and RT)
  - Optimize positions
  - Conclude close to real time trading opportunities
  - Fall Back for missed DAM trading

Opportunities:

Increasing number of less predictable generation (wind, cogeneration)

Source: Belpex



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Source: Belpex



#### Possible Improvements Intraday between France and Belgium

- Explicit intraday allocation of border capacity
- After a start-up period with less gates, 12 gates will be available

Gate (G)	Time limit for the sending of "Intra- day Access Authorisations" (G + 30 min.)	Time limit for the receiving of nominations by TSOs (G + 1Hr)	Time limit for the sending of nominations confirmations by TSOs (G + 1Hr 45)	Delivery Period
D-1 21:00	D-1 21:30	D-1 22:00	D-1 22:45	00:00 - 24:00
D-1 23:00	D-1 23:30	00:00	00:45	01:00 - 24:00
01:00	01:30	02:00	02:45	03:00 - 24:00
03:00	03:30	04:00	04:45	05:00 - 24:00
05:00	05:30	06:00	06:45	07:00 - 24:00
07:00	07:30	08:00	08:45	09:00 - 24:00
09:00	09:30	10:00	10:45	11:00 - 24:00
11:00	11:30	12:00	12:45	13:00 - 24:00
13:00	13:30	14:00	14:45	15:00 - 24:00
15:00	15:30	16:00	16:45	17:00 - 24:00
17:00	17:30	18:00	18:45	19:00 - 24:00
19:00	19:30	20:00	20:45	21:00 - 24:00

Source: Elia/RTE

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#### Possible Improvements Intraday between France and Belgium

- Advantages of Intraday:
  - Better flexibility for the balance responsible parties to face unforeseen changes
  - An optimized use op the available capacity



Provide for alternative trading opportunities prior to and after the Belpex Day-Ahead Market

- →Continuous spot market?
  - What?
    - Continuous trading of electricity from D-2 up to D-1 prior to Day-Ahead Market
    - Base load / peak load / weekend products
    - Cleared and anonymous
  - Why?
    - Increase trading opportunities
    - Create price discovery process before Day-Ahead Market




# Introduction of new products Possible approach

- Non-coupled exchange
  - Role: Portfolio fine-tuning
  - Day-ahead auction improves trade with an easy to access and <u>simple design</u>
  - New products = increasing complexity = higher transaction costs
- Coupled exchange
  - Role: gate for international trade with an increased participation in the day-ahead auction
  - Day-ahead auctions determines which plants are running with an <u>efficient design</u>
  - New products = increasing flexibility = correct incentives to the market players




- Coordination of border capacity allocation
  - More capacity for the dayahead market?
  - Extend the day-ahead coupling
    - E.g. NorNed





### Next steps: linking two regions

Source: Belpex




- NorNed cable links two regions, already internally coupled:
  - TLC region Netherlands, Belgium, France
  - Nordic region Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark
- Steering committee established:
  - 4 exchanges APX, Belpex, Nord Pool, Powernext,
  - 4 TSO's Elia, RTE, Statnett, TenneT
- Interim solution for live-date of cable October 2007
- Enduring solution



### Next steps: bridging the gap

Source: Belpex



Enduring solution:

- MMC = Multilateral Market Coupling
- Optimize Nordic and TLC region
- Open solution others can join:
  - Spain, UK, Germany
  - Invite for enduring solution
- Able of coupling many regions
- Flow-based able to handle loop flows

# Conclusions Market integration in Europe

- A lot of room for improvement
- But promising evolution
- Easier thanks to simpler design compared to US
  - Easier to move forward together
- More fine-tuned markets (e.g. North American Power Pools) more difficult to couple/integrate
  - Politically difficult to harmonize
- TLC is a success
- Formation of European agglomerative magnet?
  - Belpex (TLC) Nord Pool